

NASA Risk and Safety Culture:

Minimizing the Risk of Catastrophe by Bringing the Lessons of Space Home

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Johnson Space Center

Safety & Test Operations

November 8, 2016

- **NASA's Losses in Space and on the Ground**

- Failure is not an option we choose, but it is a reality we must face....

- **The Impact of Human Factors on Mishaps**

- **Human Error Integrated in Risk Assessment**

- Acknowledging human frailty and modeling error probabilities.

- **NASA's Safety Culture –Minimizing the Risk Environment**

- Reducing error by cultivating skill-based behavior.

- Bolstering trust throughout operations.

- Measuring safety culture growth.



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*David Loyd
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7th Annual Summit


OPERATIONAL
EXCELLENCE
IN OIL AND GAS



NASA Johnson Space Center
HOUSTON, TEXAS



Words of Wisdom



"It can only be attributable to human error."
-- HAL 9000 (2001: A Space Odyssey)




NASA Risk and Safety Culture

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NASA's Losses

Recent Mission Mishaps



**NOAA N-Prime,
September 6,
2003:**

- \$135 Million vehicle damage;
- 5.5 year mission impact.




Columbia STS-107, February 1, 2003:

- 7 fatalities;
- \$3 Billion vehicle loss;
- 2.5 year mission impact.



Genesis, September 8, 2004:

- Some sample retrieval materials lost.



DART, April 16, 2005:

- Proximity operations mission objectives lost.



OCO, February 24, 2009:

- \$280 Million vehicle loss;
- 5+ year mission impact.


**Glory, March 4,
2011:**

- \$424 Million vehicle loss;
- ??? mission impact.



NASA's Losses

Recent Institutional Mishaps



KSC Roofing Fatality, March 17, 2006

- Subcontractor died from head injuries suffered due to fall.




MSFC Freedom Star Tow-wire Injury, December 12, 2006

- Hospitalization due to internal injuries from impact with SRB tow-wire.

JSC Chamber B Asphyxiation, July 28, 2010

- Shoulder injury due to asphyxiation and fall.



WFF CNC Injury, October 28, 2010

- Sub-dermal tissue damage due to impact from machine tool shrapnel.





What is the impact of Human Factors?

- **Estimates range from 65-90% of catastrophic mishaps are due to human error.**
 - NASA's human factors-related mishaps causes are estimated at ~75%
- **As much as we'd like to error-proof our work environment, even the most automated and complex technical endeavors require human interaction...and are vulnerable to human frailty.**
- **Industry and government are focusing not only on human factors integration into hazardous work environments, but also looking for practical approaches to cultivating a strong Safety Culture that diminishes risk.**


Some Risk Measurement Philosophy...

As much as we'd like to be able to predict error, the reality is that we must measure known performance characteristics to identify vulnerabilities, mitigate greatest risk, and enable prudent response to the next accident.



High Risk Occupations vs. Space Flight

Person-Fatality Risk Per Year



Miner risk does not include fatalities due to chronic illnesses like “black lung.”

Risk increases as “drill down” into smaller and smaller groups that drive the risk.

Shuttle Astronaut risk is a very small group that has high risk.






NASA's Risk Assessment Concepts & Requirements

Risk Informed Decision-Making (RIDM)* involves:


- (1) Identification of decision alternatives, recognizing opportunities where they arise, and considering a sufficient number and diversity of performance measures to constitute a comprehensive set for decision-making purposes.***
- (2) Risk analysis of decision alternatives to support ranking.***
- (3) Selection of a decision alternative informed by (not solely based on) risk analysis results.***



* NPR 8000.4, *Agency Risk Management Procedural Requirements*

Probabilistic Risk Assessment (PRA)

- PRA integrates models based on systems engineering, probability and statistics, reliability and maintainability engineering, physical and biological sciences, decision theory, and expert opinion.
- PRA is needed when decisions need to be made that involve high stakes in a complex situation.
- The collection of risk scenarios allows the dominant risk factors to be identified, then modified or eliminated to improve the probability of success.




Representing the World via Bayesian Inference.

Human Reliability Analysis (HRA) Integration with Probabilistic Risk Assessment (PRA)



- In the PRA context, HRA is the assessment of the reliability and risk impact of the interactions of humans on a system or a function.
- For situations that involve a large number of human-system interactions, HRA becomes an important element of PRA to ensure a realistic assessment of the risk.
- In general, the Human Reliability Analysis process has a number of distinct steps, as shown below:



Adapted from NASA/SP-2011-3421, Probabilistic Risk Assessment Procedures Guide for NASA Managers and Practitioners

Performance Shaping Factors (PSF)

- PSFs impact human performance in a variety of ways, such as intelligence, expertise, emotion, harsh conditions, conflicting orders, etc.
- PSFs are incorporated into HRA error modeling, accommodating anticipated human interaction with critical tasking.
- We work to minimize the affects of PSFs, but our expectation of performance must acknowledge their potential impact to operations.





Minimizing Human Error and Cultivating a Reduced Risk Environment

Rasmussen's 3 Human Responses to Operator Information Processing

1. **Skill-based:** requires little or no cognitive effort.
2. **Rule-based:** driven by procedures or rules.
3. **Knowledge-based:** requires problem solving/decision making.



"The fewer rules a coach has, the fewer rules there are for players to break."


John Madden

"Successful design is not the achievement of perfection but the minimization and accommodation of imperfection."

Henry Petroski

Trust is the foundation of an effective Safety Culture

Trust is what drives open reporting and dialog to assure the most information is available to inform successful decision-making.





How Safety Culture Promotes Operational Excellence



- **By advocating a pervasive Safety Culture, we can provide our workforce with:**
 - Clear emphasis on continuous learning.
 - Encouragement to develop intuitive personal values.
 - Guidelines for decision-making behavior that focuses on long-term success.
 - Reinforcement to build trust by reporting and communicating concerns and ideas.
- **Practicing an effective Safety Culture:**
 - Builds Skill-based and Knowledge-based response mechanisms,
 - Reduces the emphasis on Rule-based response,
 - And breaks down barriers to Trust.

The NASA Safety Culture



"I believe that this nation should commit itself to achieving the goal, before this decade is out, of landing a man on the moon and returning him safely to the earth."

– John F. Kennedy address to Congress, May 25, 1962



- Space-related tragedies have marked our safety culture evolution.
- It's not possible to perpetuate a safety culture in space without taking care of each other on the ground and at home.



The NASA Safety Culture

NASA Safety Culture Working Group, consisting of membership from each NASA Center, has been active since early 2009.

NASA's Definition of Safety Culture –

“An environment characterized by safe attitudes and behaviors modeled by leaders and embraced by all that fosters an atmosphere of open communication, mutual trust, shared safety values and lessons, and confidence that we will balance challenges and risks consistent with our core value of safety to successfully accomplish our mission.”

NASA's Safety Culture Model

An effective safety culture is characterized by the following subcomponents:

Reporting Culture

We report our concerns

Just Culture

We have a sense of fairness

Flexible Culture

We change to meet new demands

Learning Culture

We learn from our successes and mistakes

Engaged Culture

Everyone does his or her part



Catastrophic Event Impact

Using the Safety Culture Model to Analyze NASA's History



Apollo 1 – January 27, 1967

Reporting – Procedures were subjected to last-minute changes that were not tracked, recorded or communicated.

Just – Absence of information on this factor attests to the general neglect at the time of organizational behavior as a key factor in mishaps.

Flexible – Willingness to change was weak in the presence of compelling important information.

Learning – NASA failed to appreciate the significant hazards of a 100% oxygen environment.

Engaged – NASA provided insufficient surveillance over its own management functions.



Catastrophic Event Impact

Using the Safety Culture Model to Analyze NASA's History

Apollo 13 – April 13, 1970


Reporting – Incomplete and sometimes incorrect information was used in problem solving.

Just – Absence of information on this factor attests to the general neglect at the time of organizational behavior as a key factor in mishaps.

Flexible – Demonstrated ability to adapt quickly to an emergency although flexibility prior to the mishap is unclear.

Learning – While safeguards had been implemented following the Apollo 1 fire, key aspects of design, workmanship, and material use remained vulnerable to oxygen flammability.

Engaged – Solutions immediately following the oxygen tank explosion represent an engaged team.



Catastrophic Event Impact

Using the Safety Culture Model to Analyze NASA's History



Challenger – January 28, 1986

Reporting – Ineffective problem reporting requirements and practices.

Just – Stifled communication regarding O-ring susceptibility to cold conditions.

Flexible – Launch concerns were dismissed in the face of significant schedule pressure.

Learning – Trend analysis was inadequate as evidenced by identification of a number of burn-through events which occurred prior to STS-51L.

Engaged – NASA management lacked involvement in critical discussions.

Catastrophic Event Impact

Using the Safety Culture Model to Analyze NASA's History



Columbia – February 1, 2003

Reporting – Foam shedding was a known problem, yet foam impact data was still being analyzed at the time of the flight, and not considered a serious hazard.

Just – Some engineers were reluctant to raise concerns when faced with a return of an “in God we trust - all others bring data” attitude.

Flexible – Like the Challenger mishap, the Shuttle Program was experiencing schedule pressure challenges.

Learning – With “normalization of deviance,” foam had become classified as “in-family” and as a negligible risk to the orbiter.

Engaged – “Echos” of the Challenger mishap were evident.

NASA Safety Culture Model Applied to Deepwater Horizon

Deepwater Horizon – April 20, 2010

Reporting – Procedures were subjected to last-minute distribution, last minute decision.

Just – Concerns of rig workers regarding test results were muted, not heeded or explored .

Flexible – All involved seemed prepared to exercise flexibility, but this may be indicative of insufficient process discipline.

Learning – Invalid confidence in new slurry, vents from Mud-Gas Separator (MGS) allowed gas to enter rig spaces, insufficient planning for contingencies.

Engaged – Incorrect reading of pressure tests, lack of recognition or timely control action related to kicks, diverted flow through MGS instead of overboard, reluctance to activate Blow-Out Preventer (BOP), reluctance to activate the Emergency Disconnect System, BOP testing and maintenance.





Safety Culture – Comparing Oil & Gas with NASA

“Each and every person involved in the wide range of activities associated with the offshore oil and gas program should emphasize the need to integrate safety and environmental stewardship into personal, company, and government performance objectives.” - Bureau of Safety & Environmental Enforcement, May 2013

NASA’s Safety Culture

Reporting Culture – We report our concerns.

Just Culture – We have a sense of fairness.

Flexible Culture – We change to meet new demands.

Learning Culture – We learn from our successes and mistakes.

Engaged Culture – Everyone does his or her part.

BSEE’s Nine Characteristics of a Strong Safety Culture

2. Hazard identification and risk management

6. Environment for raising concerns

7. Effective Safety and Environmental Communication

8. Respectful work environment

4. Work processes

5. Continuous improvement

9. Inquiring attitude


1. Leadership commitment to safety values and actions

3. Personal accountability




Measuring Safety Culture

2015 Safety Culture Survey Results



JSC R1 through R3 Comment Quality Analysis



“Quality” is equivalent to Likert Value associated with received comments.
 “Engagement” is the average number of comments per SCS participant.

Comment Temperature Perspectives

HOT

“Eliminate the recalcitrant dinosaur dictators”

WARM

“Emphasis on purpose of safety measures, not just filling out a form or checking a box.”

TEPID

“Watch out for everyone”
 “Communication”

COOL

“Keep doing what you are doing. We are constantly being reminded of Safety and its importance.”

The Path to Operational Excellence

- **NASA, like the Oil and Gas industry, has suffered very catastrophic losses.**
- **Human error will likely never be completely eliminated as a factor in our failures.**
- **Acknowledging human frailty and the potential for failure bolsters our ability to manage risks and mitigate the worst consequences.**
- **Building an effective Safety Culture bolsters skill-based performance that minimizes risk and encourages operational excellence.**





Backup Charts



Columbia STS-107, February 1, 2003:

7 fatalities;
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Kalpana Chawla
Rick D. Husband
Laurel B. Clark
Ilan Ramon
Michael P. Anderson
David M. Brown
William C. McCool





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




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November 8, 2016



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